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NOTE
PREVENTING "SENSELESS" ARRESTS:
SEARCHING FOR A CONSTITUTIONAL
RESOLUTION OF ATWATER V. CITY OF
LAGO VISTA
I.

INTRODUCTION

In March 1997, Gail Atwater was driving in Lago Vista, Texas,
with her two children.' No one in the car was wearing a seatbelt.2 Officer
Bart Turek stopped Atwater's vehicle.3 The Officer then handcuffed
Atwater, placed her in the squad car, and took her to the police station.
At the station, Atwater had to remove her shoes, jewelry, eyeglasses, and
empty her pockets.5 After having her "mug shot" taken, Atwater was
placed in a jail cell where she remained for about an hour before she was
taken in front of the magistrate and released on $310 bond.6
When the case ultimately reached the Supreme Court, a majority of
the Court observed:
[Gail Atwater] was a known and established resident of Lago Vista
with no place to hide and no incentive to flee, and common sense says
she would almost certainly have buckled up as a condition of driving

off with a citation.. In her case, the physical incidents of arrest were
merely gratuitous humiliations imposed by a police officer who was (at
best) exercising extremely poor judgment. Atwater's claim to live free
of pointless indignity and confinement clearly outweighs anything the
City can raise against it specific to her case.'

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

See Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 322 (2001).
See id. at 323.
See id. at 324.
See id at 324-25.
See id.
See id.
Id. at 346-47.
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Despite the rebuke, the Court ruled against Gail Atwater,8 holding
that her Fourth Amendment rights had not been violated by her arrest for
failing to wear a seatbelt.9
It is axiomatic that the Fourth Amendment protects individuals
from unreasonable search and seizure,' ° and that the freedom from such
search and seizure is often recognized as a liberty interest of the greatest
importance." While custodial arrest is the ultimate antithesis of this
freedom," nevertheless, in April of 2001, the Supreme Court upheld the
validity of the warrantless arrest of Gail Atwater for a minor traffic
offense punishable by fine only.'3 In doing so, the Supreme Court settled
an important question, at leastfor the time being, holding that the Fourth
Amendment does not protect against such an arrest. 4 At the very least,
this decision by the Court has not been a popular one."
This Note discusses whether substantive due process protections
could invalidate future arrests for minor traffic offenses or other minor
crimes punishable by fine only.' 6 Part II provides background

8. See id.
9. See id. at 323.
10. The Fourth Amendment states:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue,
but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing
the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
I1. The Supreme Court has been careful not to "minimize the importance and fundamental
nature of this right." United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 750 (1987).
12. See Barbara C. Salken, The General Warrant of the Twentieth Century? A Fourth
Amendment Solution to Unchecked Discretion to Arrest for Traffic Offenses, 62 TEMP. L. REV. 221,
264-65 (1989). Noteworthy in this article is Professor Salken's conclusion that "Custodial arrest for
a minor traffic offense is an infringement on individual freedom that is prohibited by the fourth
amendment." Id. at 275.
13. See Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 323 (2001).
14. See id. at 354.
15. See Thomas Y. Davies, The Fictional Character of Law-and-Order Originialism: A Case
Study of the Distortions and Evasions of Framing-Era Arrest Doctrine in Atwater v. City of Lago
Vista, 37 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 239, 268 (2002); A Supreme Wrong. Trashing the Fourth
Amendment, SAN DIEGO UNION TRIB., May 8, 2001, at B8; Ira Mickenberg, 'Atwater' Poses Issues,
NAT'L L. J., Aug. 6, 2001 at C9; see also Leonard M. Niehoff, Read All About It: Supreme Court
Cracks Down on Soccer Moms, 80 MICH. B. J. 76, 77 (2001); Milton Hirsch & David 0. Markus,
Atwater v. City of Lago Vista-'The Perfect Case,' 25 CHAMPION 46, Sept./Oct. 2001, at 48.
16. There are occasions when a warrantless arrest is proper. One example is when an
individual presents a threat of harm to him or herself or others. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 169.91
(2000). Although the statute requires the issuance of a citation for certain traffic offenses, it
explicitly authorizes arrest for an accident resulting in injury or death, negligent homicide, involving
influence of intoxicating liquor or drugs, and failure to stop in event of accident. See id.
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information on the several lower federal court decisions'" and the
Supreme Court decision in Atwater v. City of Lago Vista.'8 Part III
introduces the concept of substantive due process.' 9 Part IV discusses
initial hurdles to making a constitutional argument in the context of
Atwater, other than the Fourth Amendment argument already rejected by
the Supreme Court. Part V discusses the Atwater facts under the rubric
of a substantive due process analysis. Part VI concludes the argument
that warrantless arrests for minor traffic violations are unconstitutional.
II.BACKGROUND
A. The Decisions in Atwater v. City of Lago Vista
1. The United States District Court Case
After her arrest, Atwater filed a civil suit in the Texas state court
alleging both federal and state law grounds for relief, including that her
Fourth Amendment rights had been violated." The defendants properly
removed the case to the United States District Court for the Western
District of Texas.2'

17. See, e.g., Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 195 F.3d 242 (5th Cir. 1999), aff'd 532 U.S. 318;
(2001); Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 165 F.3d 380 (5th Cir.), reh'g granted, 171 F.3d 258 (5th
Cir.), and rev'd en banc, 195 F.3d 242 (5th Cir. 1999); Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, No. A-97 CA
679 (W.D. Tex. filed Feb. 13, 1999) (unpublished opinion on file with the author).
18. See Atwater, 532 U.S. at 318.
19. The relevant due process portions of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments are as follows:
"[N]or be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." U.S. CONST. amend. V.
"[Nior shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law."
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
20. See Atwater, 195 F.3d at 244. Atwater eventually pled no contest to not wearing a seatbelt
and allowing her children not to wear seatbelts. See Atwater, 165 F.3d at 383. Charges of driving
without a license and proof of insurance were dismissed. See id. Atwater brought suit against the
City of Lago Vista under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See id. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 states in pertinent part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of
any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected,
any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the
deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws,
shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper
proceeding for redress.
Id. Her causes of action were, "(1) Deprivation of Constitutional Rights, (2) Excessive Use of Force,
(3) False Imprisonment, (4) Inadequate Training, (5) Failure to Supervise, (6) Intentional Infliction
of Emotional Distress, (7) Assault and Battery, (8) Grossly Negligent Hiring and Retention,
(9) Conspiracy to Formulate and Enforce a Municipal Policy to Violate Constitutional Rights, and
(10) Common Fund." Atwater, 195 F.3d at 244, nI.
21. See Atwater, 532 U.S. at 325.
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To say that Judge Sparks, of the United States District Court for the
Western District of Texas, found Atwater's claims unsupportable, may
be putting it mildly.22 A clear illustration of Judge Sparks' feelings
toward Atwater's claims can be found in his closing remarks: "[t]his is a
lawsuit that should have never been filed and was poorly litigated once it
was. Suits such as this are [the] bane of the American legal system. 23
The court found all of Atwater's claims meritless, and granted
summary judgment for the defendants.24 The court applied a qualified
immunity test to Atwater's constitutional claims. 25 "Qualified immunity
shields state officials from suit for damages provided their conduct does
not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which
a reasonable person should have known., 26 Applying this two-part test,
the court found that the plaintiff failed to demonstrate that the defendant
violated any clearly established constitutional or statutory right.27
Therefore, it was not necessary to proceed to the second prong of the
test, which would have asked whether the defendants' conduct was
objectively reasonable in light of the constitutional or statutory right.
Nevertheless, in dicta, the court made it a point to say that the second
prong of the test was also not met."
The court moved even more swiftly to dispose of Atwater's state
law claims.29 Under Texas law, a governmental unit is protected by
sovereign immunity from suit arising from any tort unless the tort was
spawned by operation of a motor vehicle or the use of tangible personal
property. ° Judge Sparks found it "laughable" to suggest that the
exception to the sovereign immunity defense had been met in this case."
2. The Fifth Circuit
A panel of the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed part
of the district court's ruling.32 Although the district court found quite
clearly that Atwater failed to state a claim under the Fourth
22. See Atwater, No. A-97 CA 679, at 55a (W.D. Tex. filed Feb. 13, 1999) (unpublished
opinion on file with author).
23. Id. at 62a.
24. See id. at 51 a.
25. See id. at 55a.
26. Id.
27. See id. at 56a.
28. See id.
29. See id. at 61 a.
30. See id.
31. See id.
32. See Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 165 F.3d 380 (5th Cir.), reh'g granted, 171 F.3d 258
(5th Cir.), and rev'd en banc, 195 F.3d 242 (5th Cir. 1999).
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Amendment,33 the Fifth Circuit reversed, finding that Officer Turek's
actions were constitutionally unreasonable.34 The Fifth Circuit utilized
the same test applied by the district court, namely a qualified immunity
analysis, but reached a different result.35
Under the first prong of the test, the appeals court found that there
is a clearly established constitutional right to be free from unreasonable
seizures.36 Second, the court opined that the existence of probable cause
to arrest does not end the qualified immunity analysis in favor of the
City of Lago Vista; the second part of the analysis still remained
necessary. 37
Under the second part of the test, the panel found that the seizure
was objectively unreasonable. The court first noted the significance of
the fact that the law Atwater violated was paternalistic, in that Atwater
could only harm herself, not others. 39 A drunk or reckless driver poses a
threat to all others on the streets, and such an arrest brings a measure of
safety to society.40 Conversely, arresting a seatbelt violator will not make
the streets any safer for others.4 ' The court reasoned that officers should
be forced to make distinctions between times where it is appropriate and42
inappropriate to arrest, although arrest may be authorized by the statute
in both instances.43 As the court noted, it is logical to distinguish
between minor and serious offenses when analyzing the reasonableness
of an arrest under the Fourth Amendment."
The panel then conducted a balancing test to determine whether this
arrest was reasonable, weighing, as one factor, the state's interest in the
arrest, which could only have been the enforcement of the seatbelt law.45
Most would say that such an interest is minimal. 46 The court found that,
33. See id. at 383.
34. See id.
35. See id. at 384.
36. See id.
37. See id.
38. See id. at 388.
39. See id. at 385. Although the fact that Atwater failed to buckle her children, putting them at
risk, would undercut this point, none of the courts which heard this case discussed this aspect of the
incident. Rather, they only discussed the fact that Gail Atwater failed to buckle herself.
40. See Hirsch & Markus, supra note 15, at 46-47.
41. See id. at 47.
42. Texas law authorizes, but does not require, the arrest of an individual violating the
seatbelt law. See TEX. TRANSP. CODE ANN. § 543.001 (1999).
43. See Atwater, 165 F.3d at 386.
44. See id.
45. See id. at 387.
46. One comment plausibly suggests that even the Texas legislature did not intend for anyone
to be arrested for failing to comply with the seatbelt law. See Tamra J. Carsten, Comment,
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"[t]he only reason to arrest Atwater instead of issuing her a citation
under these circumstances was to harass and impose a level of
punishment beyond the limitations of the statute. We cannot
countenance such abuse from an officer of the law. 47
The Fifth Circuit, en banc, vacated the panel's decision and granted
a rehearing. In a terse majority opinion, the Fifth Circuit now upheld
the district court decision.5 0 The Fifth Circuit found that, "because [the
arrest] was based on probable cause and because it was not conducted
in... [an] 'extraordinary manner,' Officer Turek's arrest of Atwater
was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment."'" The en banc majority
reasoned that if an officer has probable cause 52 to arrest, only in the most

ConstitutionalLaw: Narrowing the Scope of the Fourth Amendment, Atwater v. City of Lago Vista,
54 FLA. L. REV. 567, 574 (2002).
47. Atwater, 165 F.3d at 388.
48. See Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 171 F.3d 258 (5th Cir. 1999) (vacating the panel's
decision).
49. The majority's opinion is seven paragraphs long (or short). See Atwater v. City of Lago
Vista, 195 F.3d 242, 244-46 (5th Cir. 1999), affd, 532 U.S. 318 (2001). "The majority opinion for
the en banc court is a model of tight-lipped Texan terseness." Hirsch & Markus, supra note 15, at
47 (footnote omitted).
50. See Atwater, 195 F.3d at 246.
51. Id. (quoting Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 818 (1996)) (emphasis added).
52. The significance of the fact that Officer Turek had probable cause to arrest, in that he
witnessed Atwater commit a crime in his presence, is given different treatment in both Fifth Circuit
opinions as well as the Supreme Court opinion. See Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318,
354 (2001); Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 195 F.3d 242, 245 (5th Cir. 1999), aff'd, 532 U.S. 318
(2001); Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 165 F.3d 380, 384 (5th Cir.), reh'g granted, 171 F.3d 258
(5th Cir.), and rev'd en banc, 195 F.3d 242 (5th Cir. 1999). The interaction between the Fourth
Amendment reasonableness test and the existence of probable cause, could probably constitute an
entire note on its own. The issue of probable cause and warrantless arrest came before the Supreme
Court after Atwater. See Arkansas v. Sullivan, 532 U.S. 769, (2001). In this case, an individual had
been arrested for speeding, driving without a registration or insurance card, carrying a roofing
hatchet, and improper window tinting. See id. at 770. The Court supported its Atwater conclusion
and found that with probable cause, an officer's discretion to arrest is unlimited. See id. at 773
(Ginsburg, J., concurring). At the same time, the concurring opinion of Justice Ginsburg, joined by
the same Justices that made up the dissent in Atwater (Justices O'Connor, Stevens and Breyer)
noted: "[I]f experience demonstrates 'anything like an epidemic of unnecessary minor-offense
arrests,' I hope the Court will reconsider its recent precedent." Id. (quoting Atwater v. City of Lago
Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 353 (2001)). Some would argue that the "epidemic" of "senseless" arrests has
already begun. See Frank J. Murray, Minor Crimes Split Courts on Rights, WASH. TIMES, Mar. 17,
2002, at A3 ("Robert C. DeCarli, the Austin, Texas, lawyer who lost the Atwater case... filed
statistics with the high court showing an estimated quarter-million [minor arrests] are made
nationwide every year."). Also discussed in this article is People v. McKay, 41 P.3d 59 (Cal. 2002).
In McKay, an individual was arrested for riding his bicycle on the wrong side of a residential street.
See id. at 63. The court held, pursuant to Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, "there is nothing inherently
unconstitutional about effecting a custodial arrest for a fine only offense." Id. at 64. See also Linda
Greenhouse, Divided Justices Back Full Arrests on Minor Charges, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 25, 2001,
at AI.
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extraordinary of circumstances will such an arrest be found to violate the
Fourth Amendment rights of an individual. 3 The Supreme Court has
defined "extraordinary" in the Fourth Amendment context as a seizure
involving deadly force, unannounced entry into the home, entry into the
home without a warrant, or physical penetration of the body. The court
concluded no such "extraordinary" circumstances were present in Gail
Atwater's case."
In dissent, Judge Wiener used both facts and legal argument to
reach a contrary conclusion. 6 His analysis of the facts led him to
speculate whether Officer Turek was seeking to settle a personal grudge
against Atwater.57 Prior to the March 1997 arrest of Gail Atwater,
Officer Turek had pulled her over once before. 8 On this occasion Officer
Turek thought Atwater had failed to secure her child in a seatbelt, but
was surprised to find that the child was, indeed, wearing a seatbelt.59
Turek let Atwater continue on her way, without issuing a citation or
making an arrest. 6°
Turning to Judge Wiener's legal argument, he analyzed the
reasonableness of the arrest under three criteria: the government's
interest in effecting the seizure; the degree of certainty that the seizure
would in fact further the governmental interest; and the extent of the
infringement on the individual's constitutionally protected liberties.6 '
The Judge concluded that such a balancing here would result in finding
that the arrest was objectively unreasonable because of the pervasive
intrusion on Atwater's liberty measured against the countervailing
interest of society in securing her arrest for the seatbelt violation.62
Legitimate interests to consider in making a custodial arrest, Judge
Wiener observed, are to prevent flight, the need to interrogate or search
an individual, and the need to protect the community from a threat of

53. See Atwater, 195 F.3d at 244.
54. See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 818 (1996).
55. See Atwater, 195 F.3d at 246.
56. See id. at 247-51 (Wiener, J., dissenting).
57. See id. at 248 (Wiener, J., dissenting).
58. See id. (Wiener, J., dissenting).
59. See id. (Wiener, J., dissenting).
60. See id. Ironically, Officer Turek failed to seatbelt Atwater in the squad car. See Atwater v.
City of Lago Vista, No. A-97 CA 679, at 57a (W.D. Tex. filed Feb. 13, 1999) (unpublished opinion
on file with the author).
61. See Atwater, 195 F.3d at 248-49 (Wiener, J., dissenting).
62. See id. at 249-50 (Wiener, J., dissenting).
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that
harm that the individual poses.63 Judge Wiener's dissent concluded
6
4
Atwater.
Gail
of
arrest
the
by
served
were
interests
none of these
Separately, Judge Garza observed, in his dissent, that Officer Turek
may not have been the best candidate to qualify as a police officer in the
first place. 65 A member of the Recruitment Unit of the Austin Police
Department submitted an affidavit indicating that, after reviewing
Turek's personnel file, he would not have recommended Turek for hire
because of his lack of maturity, evidenced by his reasons for leaving
previous employment, his failure of two out of three reported
psychological tests at the Austin Police Department, and his failure to
give complete information to the department. 66
3. The Supreme Court
In April of 2001, the Supreme Court issued its 5-4 opinion in favor
of the City of Lago Vista.67 Justice Souter wrote for a majority that
included Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia, Kennedy, and
Thomas.68 Justices 69 Stevens, Ginsburg and Breyer joined Justice
O'Connor's dissent.
The question posed to the Court was "whether the Fourth
Amendment forbids a warrantless arrest for a minor criminal offense,
such as a misdemeanor seatbelt violation punishable only by a fine."70
The Court first turned to Atwater's argument that police officers'
authority to make warrantless arrests for misdemeanors was restricted at
common law.7' The majority here went into a lengthy historical
discussion, concluding that neither the common law nor early American
history unequivocally supported Atwater's position that misdemeanor
arrests were limited to "breach of the peace" instances.72
63. See id. at 250 (Wiener, J., dissenting); see also infra notes 231-40 and accompanying text.
64. See id. at 250 (Wiener, J., dissenting).
dissenting).
65. See id. at 247 (Garza, J.,
66. See id. (Garza, J., dissenting).
67. See Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318 (2001).
68. See id. at 322.
69. See id.
70. Id. at 323.
71. See id. at 326-27.
72. See id. at 326-46. Professor LaFave would disagree with the Supreme Court: "A warrant
was required except when a breach of the peace occurred in the presence of the arresting officer." 3
WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE, A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT, § 5.1, at 13
(3d ed. 1996). For a thorough analysis of the Supreme Court's historical arguments, see Davies,
supra note 15. The article argues that:
[Justice] Souter's claims bear little resemblance to authentic framing-era arrest
doctrine ... his supposed historical analysis consisted almost entirely of rhetorical ploys
and distortions of historical sources. The historical authorities regarding arrest authority
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Second, the Court addressed Atwater's argument that a modem
arrest rule should be adopted that forbids custodial arrest, even upon
probable cause, when conviction could not result in incarceration and the
government fails to show compelling need for immediate detention.73
The Court noted that if such a rule were applied to the Atwater facts, she
could very well win.74 However, the Court rejected such a broad-brush
rule on the ground that "a responsible Fourth Amendment balance is not
well served by standards requiring sensitive, case-by-case
determinations of government need, lest every discretionary judgment in
the field be converted into an occasion for constitutional review."75 The
justification offered for avoiding ad hoc decision-making in this instance
is that it would be difficult for the officer on the street to know which
crimes are and which are not punishable with incarceration.76 The Court
concluded that "the standard of probable cause 'applies to all arrests,
without the need to "balance" the interests and circumstances involved
in particular situations.' ,77 An officer can arrest without violating the
Constitution whenever he witnesses even a very minor criminal offense
71
committed in his presence.
actually show that warrantless misdemeanor arrests for minor offenses were usually
unlawful, except in some categories of minor offenses that gave rise to an unusual need
for a prompt arrest ....
Id. at 246. Interestingly, Davies' historical research revealed that the framers envisioned due
process protections to apply to arrest standards. See id. at 394.
73. See Atwater, 532 U.S. at 346.
74. See id.
75. Id. at 347.
76. See id. at 348. This conclusion that an officer would not, and should not, be expected to
know which offenses may result in incarceration has been disputed by Leading Case, 115 HARV. L.
REV. 306, 340 (2001). "[Ihf the determination whether a particular crime is statutorily arrestable
falls within the competence of police officers (as most criminal codes assume), it is not clear why it
would exceed their competence to learn which crimes are statutorily jailable and thus
constitutionally arrestable." Id. (footnote omitted).
77. Atwater, 532 U.S. at 354 (quoting Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 208 (1979)).
This conclusion seems to be at least somewhat at odds with prior Supreme Court precedent. Cf
Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (1985).
A police officer may arrest a person if he has probable cause to believe that person
committed a crime. Petitioners and appellant argue that if this requirement is satisfied the
Fourth Amendment has nothing to say about how that seizure is made. This submission
ignores the many cases in which this Court, by balancing the extent of the intrusion
against the need for it, has examined the reasonableness of the manner in which a search
or seizure is conducted. To determine the constitutionality of a seizure we must balance
the nature and quality of the intrusion on the individual's Fourth Amendment interests
against the importance of the governmental interests alleged to justify the intrusion.
Id. at 7-8 (internal quotations and citations omitted). While the Court in Atwater seems to be ending
the inquiry with the determination that probable cause exists, this precedent suggests that there is
still a need to conduct the reasonableness inquiry.
78. SeeAtwater, 532 U.S. at 354.
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Justice O'Connor dissented on the ground that the balancing test
required by the Fourth Amendment weighs in favor of Ms. Atwater.79
According to Justice O'Connor, reviewing the appropriate factors,
specifically the state's interest in effecting the arrest in this particular
circumstance, points strongly toward the conclusion that the arrest was
unreasonable. 0 Furthermore, Justice O'Connor would adopt a new rule
that,
when there is probable cause to believe that a fine only offense has
been committed, the police officer should issue a citation unless the
officer is 'able to point to specific and articulable facts which, taken
together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant
[the additional] intrusion' of a full custodial arrest."
Justice O'Connor also observed that the city's arguments as to why
the arrest was necessary were meritless s The city argued that the arrest
promoted the enforcement of child safety laws and encouraged Atwater
to appear for trial.83 However, Justice O'Connor believed it would have
been more productive to issue a citation to teach Atwater to secure her
children in seatbelts. 8 Furthermore, Atwater was an established resident
of the community, not a flight risk for a seatbelt violation. s5

III. SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS-AN OVERVIEW
A.

Atwater's Substantive Due Process Claim

In Atwater's initial complaint, filed in the district court, she
claimed that her due process rights had been violated.86 This claim was
dismissed along with all her other claims87 when Judge Sparks granted
summary judgment for the City of Lago Vista. 88

79. See id. at 364 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
80. See id. at 365 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
81. Id. at 366 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968)).
82. See id. at 368-71 (O'Connor. J., dissenting).
83. See id. (O'Connor. J., dissenting).
84. See id. at 370 (O'Connor J., dissenting). Regarding the safety of Atwater's children, as a
result of the encounter with Officer Turek, the children had to receive treatment from a
psychologist. See id.
85. See id. at 370-71 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
86. See Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 165 F.3d 380, 383 (5th Cir.), reh'g granted 171 F.3d
258 (5th Cir,), rev'd en banc, 195 F.3d 242 (5th Cir. 1999).
87. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
88. See Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, No. A-97 CA 679 (W.D. Tex. filed Feb. 13, 1999)
(unpublished opinion on file with the author).
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When the panel for the Fifth Circuit looked at the case, it
considered Atwater's Fourth Amendment claim and no other, because
the panel believed that was the only meritorious claim.89 The later Fifth
Circuit decision, en banc, as well as the Supreme Court case, also
considered only Atwater's Fourth Amendment claim.9" Thus, the Court
of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit and the Supreme Court overlooked the
substantive due process claim, which requires further discussion. The
current standards that the Court applies in evaluating executive action
under the rubric of substantive due process make the Atwater facts, at
the very least, a close case. 91
Whether an arrest for the violation of a fine only traffic offense
violates the Constitution is not a new question." However, in the past,
such questions were usually addressed in the context of the Fourth
Amendment. 93 Now, since that Fourth Amendment issue has been firmly
settled, a closer look at substantive due process protections should be
undertaken.94
B.

Substantive Due Process-A ControversialConcept

Substantive due process review can be defined as "It]he doctrine
that the Due Process Clauses of the 5th and 14th Amendments require
legislation to be fair and reasonable in content and to further a legitimate
governmental objective.' ° , Courts have used substantive due process

89. See Atwater, 165 F.3d at 384 n2.
90. See generally Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318 (2001); Atwater v. City of
Lago Vista, 195 F.3d 242 (5th Cir. 1999), aff'd 532 U.S. 318 (2001).
91. See infra Part V.
92. See generally Salken, supra note 12.
93. See id. at 140-53.
94. At least one other commentator writing on this subject has suggested applying due process
principles to arrests for minor traffic offenses.
[T]hose making arrests do not share the Court's vision of arrests as inextricably linked to
prosecution. Instead, police increasingly use arrests for a variety of other ends including
deterrence, retribution, and order-maintenance--ends
which are essentially
indistinguishable from those of punishment .... Delinked as a practice from criminal
prosecution, arrests merit less justification and receive less regulation. These factors in
turn undercut the rationale for not subjecting all arrests, like other government
deprivations of liberty, to due process review.
Leading Case, supra note 76, at 344. In 1973, Justice Stewart remarked, "[i]t seems to me that a
persuasive claim might have been made in this case that the custodial arrest of the petitioner
[Gustafson] for a minor traffic offense violated his rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth
Amendments." Gustafson v. Florida, 414 U.S. 260, 266-67 (1973) (Stewart, J., concurring).
95. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 517 (7th ed. 1999). This definition, however, fails to take into
account that executive actions can also be reviewed. Cf. 2 RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN E.
NOWAK, TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 14.6, at 530 (3d ed. 1999) ("By 'substantive

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2002

11

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 31, Iss. 1 [2002], Art. 7

HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 31:241

review to hold legislative and executive actions unconstitutional when
they violate natural 96 or fundamental rights. 97 The use of the substantive
due process doctrine by the courts continues to be controversial.98 On
one side of the dispute are commentators such as John Hart Ely who
believe that substantive due process is a contradiction in terms.99
Professor Ely points out that nothing in the text of the Due Process
Clause authorizes a court to undertake substantive review.'" A major
concern with applying substantive due process is that the judiciary is
imposing its personal beliefs over those of the elected legislature.' °' The
Supreme Court has nonetheless continued to use the doctrine of

review' we mean the judicial determination of the compatibility of the substance of a law or
governmental action with the Constitution.").
96. Belief in the existence of "natural rights" predates the establishment of the American
republic. See I LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 8-1, at 1335 (3d ed.
2000). Natural rights, such as personal security, personal liberty and private property, could not be
infringed upon by the government acting within its rightful jurisdiction. See id. at 1336. Such rights
are "inherent," and belong to the citizens by virtue of their citizenship. See id.
97. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). In Roe, the Supreme Court held that the right
of privacy founded in the Fourteenth Amendment's concept of personal liberty covered a woman's
decision to terminate her pregnancy. See id. at 153. The Court also stated it is "clear that only
personal rights that can be deemed 'fundamental' or 'implicit in the concept of ordered liberty' are
included in this guarantee of personal privacy." Id. at 152 (quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S.
319, 325 (1937)).
98. "The doctrine of substantive due process is notorious both for the controversy that
perennially surrounds it and the unusual degree of analytical confusion that it generates." Robert
Chesney, Old Wine or New? The Shocks-the-Conscience Standard and the Distinction Between
Legislative and Executive Action, 50 SYRACUSE L. REv. 981, 981-82 (2000) (footnotes omitted);
see also Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952).
99. JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 18 (Harv. Univ. Press 1980). Professor Ely
opines that substantive due process is a contradiction in terms much like "green pastel redness." Id.
Professor Ely believes that the Fourteenth Amendment only authorized the Court to review
procedures, and that substantive review is "probably wrong." Id. at 15. However, Professor Ely does
admit that "one cannot absolutely exclude the possibility that some [framers of the Fourteenth
Amendment] ...had the question been put, would have agreed that the Due Process Clause they
were including could be given an occasional substantive interpretation." Id. at 16.
100. See id. at 16 ("[Tjhe most important datum bearing on what was intended is the
constitutional language itself").
101. Justice Black believes that courts should not have the power to review substantive matters
under the Due Process Clause; such power would be inconsistent with the Constitution. Justice
Black stated,
[T]he 'natural law' formula which the Court uses to reach its conclusion in this case
should be abandoned as an incongruous excrescence on our Constitution. I believe that
formula to be itself a violation of our Constitution, in that it subtly conveys to courts, at
the expense of legislatures, ultimate power over public policies in fields where no
specific provision of the Constitution limits legislative power.
dissenting).
Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 75 (1947) (Black, J.,
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substantive due process to review both legislative and executive
action.'°2
The current Supreme Court majority does not appear to have any
real affection for the substantive due process doctrine. Chief Justice
Rehnquist, writing for the majority in Albright v. Oliver, noted: "[T]he
Court has always been reluctant to expand the concept of substantive
due process because the guideposts for responsible decisionmaking in
this unchartered area are scarce and open-ended.' '03 Justice Scalia,
concurring in Albright, would go even a step (or a leap) further. He
would advocate the abolishment of all unenumerated substantive due
process rights while retaining the procedural aspects of the Due Process
Clause. ' 04
Of particular importance to this discussion is the Supreme Court's
treatment of substantive due process claims arising in the executive
action context. The Court has stated that the core of a substantive due
process inquiry in this setting is "protection against arbitrary action."'0 5
The Court has developed a standard in this context that requires a
governmental action to "shock[ ] the conscience" to be deemed
"arbitrary" in the constitutional sense.06
Atwater is a good case for a substantive due process review because
it involves arbitrary government action.3 7 Officer Turek made a
deliberate decision to arrest Gail Atwater. The arrest was not required by
the statute.' °8 Officer Turek chose to arrest Gail Atwater instead of
issuing a citation. Additionally, it should be noted that the liberty at

102. See, e.g., Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 728 (1997) (Court used historical
analysis to conclude that right to physician assisted suicide was not, at least not yet, fundamental.
Therefore, substantive due process protections did not apply); County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523
U.S. 833 (1998) (analyzing police officer's actions under substantive due process).
103. Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271-72 (1994).
104. See id. at 275-76 (Scalia, J., concurring).
Except insofar as our decisions have included within the Fourteenth Amendment certain
explicit substantive protections of the Bill of Rights-an extension I accept because it is
both long established and narrowly limited-I reject the proposition that the Due Process
Clause guarantees certain (unspecified) liberties, rather than merely guarantees certain
procedures as a prerequisite to deprivation of liberty.
Id. at 275.
105. County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 845 (1998).
106. Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172-73 (1952).
107. Officer Turek exercised his discretion in arresting Gail Atwater. Because the arrest was
made without serving any legitimate government interest, the arrest should properly be
characterized as "arbitrary." See infra notes 230-41 and accompanying text.
108. See TEX. TRANSP. CODE ANN. § 543.001 (1999) ("Any peace officer may arrest without
warrant a person found committing a violation of this subtitle.") (emphasis added).
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issue in Gail Atwater's case, freedom from physical restraint, is properly
characterized as a "fundamental" right.0 9
C. Substantive Due Process in the Executive Setting-The Origination
of the "Shocks the Conscience" Standard
0
1. Rochin v. California"
Although it has traveled a somewhat tumultuous path, the standard
by which executive action is judged in the substantive due process
context can be traced back to Rochin v. California."' The facts of Rochin
are relatively simple. Three deputy sheriffs of Los Angeles County,
acting on information that Rochin was selling narcotics, entered his
home on July 1, 1949."' The deputies found Rochin and spied two
capsules beside the bed next to him." 3 Rochin quickly ingested the
capsules." 4 After the police were unable to manually retrieve the
capsules, they took Rochin to a doctor where a stomach pumping
procedure was performed." 5 Rochin was induced to vomit and the
officers recovered the two capsules, which were found to contain
morphine." 6
The Court was faced with the question as to what limitations they
were required to put on the conduct of the states in light of the
protections of the Due Process Clause."' Although the Court realized
that the contours of the Due Process Clause were "indefinite and vague,"
they were still forced to announce a standard by which to judge
executive action." 8 The Court reasoned that due process requires:

an evaluation based on a disinterested inquiry pursued in the spirit of
science, on a balanced order of facts exactly and fairly stated, on the
detached consideration of conflicting claims, on a judgment not ad hoc

109. It should be noted that the "liberty" contemplated by the language of the Fifth
Amendment's Due Process Clause, entails, at the least, freedom from bodily restraint. See Charles
Warren, The New "Liberty" Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 39 HARV. L. REV. 431, 440 (19251926).
110. 342 U.S. 165 (1952).
111. Seeid. at173.
112. See id. at 166.
113. See id.
114. See id.
115. See id.
116. See id.
117. See id. at 166.
118. Id. at 172.
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and episodic but duly mindful of reconciling the needs both of
continuity and of change in a progressive society.'

The Court concluded, in light of an evaluation of the facts of the
case, that the executive action in question "shock[ed] the conscience.' 2 °
2. The Evolution of Substantive Due Process in the Supreme
Court Since Rochin
Following Rochin, the Court tackled the issue of what exactly
would and would not constitute a substantive due process violation in
the executive setting.12' An act of negligence will not rise to.the level of a
substantive due process violation. 2 2 In Daniels v. Williams, an inmate in
a local jail slipped and fell on a pillow negligently left on the stairs by a
corrections officer.'23 The Court observed that the history of the Due
Process Clause indicates that it has only been applied to situations where
the government has acted deliberately to injure a plaintiff, and not
negligently. ' 2 Therefore, negligent conduct by a state official causing
injury does not amount to a due process violation.'
Although the application of the "shocks the conscience" test may
not have been uniform after Rochin, the Court once again applied this
standard in holding that another negligence-based claim did not amount
to a substantive due process violation.'26 In Collins v. City of Harker
Heights, the Supreme Court found that the failure to provide a
reasonably safe work environment did not constitute a substantive due
process violation. 7 In Collins, an employee, in the Texas sanitation
department died after entering a manhole to unstop a sewer line.' 28 The
plaintiff's estate alleged that his substantive due process rights were

119. Id. (citation omitted).
120. Id. For a discussion of the plight of the "shocks the conscience" standard, see Matthew D.
Umhofer, Confusing Pursuits: Sacramento v. Lewis and the Future of Substantive Due Process in
the Executive Setting, 41 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 437, 455-76 (2001).
121. See, e.g., Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327 (1986).
122. See id. at 328.
123. See id.
124. Seeid. at331.
125. See id. at 336.
126. See Collins v. City of Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 128 (1992). see also Umhofer, supra
note 120, at 462. Umhofer observes that "[t]he shocks the conscience standard was rarely mentioned
after Rochin . .. [a]fter a long period of dormancy, the shocks the conscience test resurfaced in
Collins v. City of HarkerHeights. Id. However, the Supreme Court has disagreed. See County of
Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 846-47 (1998) ("[Iun the intervening years we have repeatedly
adhered to Rochin's benchmark.").
127. See Collins, 503 U.S. at 128.
128. See id. at 117.
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violated because the city deprived him of life due to its failure to provide
a reasonably safe work environment. 29 The Court quickly concluded,
"we ... are not persuaded that the city's alleged failure to train its
employees, or to warn them about known risks of harm, was an omission
that can properly be characterized as arbitrary, or conscience shocking,
in a constitutional sense."' 3
The Court has stopped short of requiring deliberate action in all
executive action cases in order to substantiate a due process violation. 3 '
When asserting a section 1983 claim that a police officer's lack of
training amounts to a due process violation, a plaintiff must show "the
failure to train amounts to deliberate indifference to the rights of persons
with whom the police come into contact."'' In City of Canton v. Harris,
the Supreme Court remanded the case to determine if the failure to
provide medical attention to an arrestee met the threshold of deliberate
indifference as to the adequacy of the training provided by the
municipality. 3 3 More recently, the Court again addressed the issue of
executive action and substantive due process in County of Sacramento v.
Lewis. 14
D. The Modern Formulationof Substantive Due Process in the
Executive Setting
County of Sacramento v. Lewis held that different levels of
"deliberateness" will be required when attempting to prove a substantive
due process violation. 3 In County of Sacramento, a police officer
witnessed two youths operating a motorcycle at a high rate of speed and
the officer decided to give chase. 3 6 Both the motorcycle and the patrol
car reached speeds of up to 100 miles per hour during this brief, seventyfive second pursuit."' The chase ended as the motorcycle tipped over
after attempting a sharp left turn. 3 8 The officer was unable to stop in
time to avoid hitting and killing the sixteen year old, Philip Lewis, who
was riding on the back of the motorcycle. 3 9
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.

See id. at 126.
Id. at 128.
See, e.g., City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388 (1989).
Id.
See id. at 392.
523 U.S. 833 (1998).
See generally id. at 836-56.
See id. at 836.
See id. at 837.
See id.
See id.
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In evaluating the Lewis' claim that Philip's substantive due process
rights had been violated, the Court reiterated that the correct standard
was whether the police action in question "shocks the conscience."' 4
The Court also went further than it had in the past to discuss what
circumstances would and would not support a due process violation.14' It
noted "liability for negligently inflicted harm is categorically beneath the
threshold of constitutional due process.' 42 But, the Court also ruled that
there was "behavior at the other end of the culpability spectrum that
would most probably support a substantive due process claim; conduct
intended to injure in some way unjustifiable by any government interest
is the sort of official action most likely to rise to the conscienceshocking level.' 43
The Court applied a time-based inquiry in evaluating whether the
officer violated Lewis' substantive due process rights. 44 If the actor has
sufficient time to deliberate about his actions, the test then asks if the
actor was deliberately indifferent to the plaintiff's well-being.' 45 If he
was, liability attaches; if not, no liability attaches.'4 6 If the actor did not
have time to deliberate, only a intent to injure the plaintiff will be
sufficient for liability to attach. 47 The Court held that when an incident
occurs during a high-speed chase, in which there is little time for
deliberation, "only a purpose to cause harm unrelated to the legitimate
object of arrest will satisfy the element of arbitrary conduct shocking to
the conscience ....
With little time to deliberate and no intent to

140. See id. at 848-49.
141. See id.
142. Id. at 849.
143. Id. Nowak and Rotunda suggest that three categories of official conduct exist. In the first,
negligently inflicted harm which never could "shock the conscience." Second is a middle range,
conduct more than negligent but less than intentional. Here, a case-by-case analysis is necessary to
determine if the action "shocked the conscience." Finally, intentional infliction of injury to persons
by a government official was the most culpable. See ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 95, at 564.
144. See Umhofer, supra note 120, at 448-49.
The shocks the conscience test as it is set forth in Lewis requires a three tiered inquiry:
1. Did the actor/s have sufficient time to deliberate? If yes, go to No. 2, if no, go to
No. 3.
2. If the actor/s had time to deliberate, were they deliberately indifferent to the
plaintiff's well-being? If yes, liability, if no, no liability.
3. If there was no time to deliberate, did the actor/s intend to injure the plaintiff? If
yes, liability, if no, no liability.
Id.
145. See id. at 449.
146. See id.
147. See id.
148. County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 836 (1998).
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harm Philip Lewis, the officer's
actions in this case did not shock the
49
conscience of the Court.
Depending on the facts and circumstances of the case, what may
"shock the conscience" in one context may not suffice in another." The
most important factor seems to be the time element. The Court provided
the example that when a prison riot occurs, the police will be given a
high level of deference because of the necessity to restore order.'5'
Similarly, in a high52 speed chase, the police will also be given a high
level of deference.
IV.

INITIAL HURDLES IN THE CONSTITUTIONAL ARGUMENT

A.

Graham v. Connor

The Supreme Court, in Graham v. Connor'53, took a restrictive step
in effectuating rights under substantive due process.'54 In Graham, the
Court held that "all claims that law enforcement officers have used
excessive force-deadly or not-in the course of an arrest, investigatory
stop, or other 'seizure' of a free citizen should be analyzed under the
Fourth Amendment and its 'reasonableness'
standard, rather than under
55
approach.'
process'
due
a 'substantive
In Graham, Dethorne Graham, a diabetic, requested that a friend
drive him to a nearby convenience store to purchase orange juice to
counteract an insulin reaction. 5 6 When faced with a long line of patrons
at the convenience store, Graham quickly departed and urged the friend
to drive him to another location to acquire the juice.'57 An officer
observed the actions of Graham at the store, became suspicious, and
eventually pulled the car over.'58 The encounter quickly spun out of
149. See id. The lower courts have applied the framework enunciated in County of Sacramento.
See Leamer v. Fauver, 288 F.3d 532, 546-47 (3d Cir. 2002); Brown v. NationsBank Corp., 188 F.3d
579, 591-92 (5th Cir. 1999).
150. See County of Sacramento, 523 U.S. at 850.
151. See id. at 852-53.
152. Seeid. at853.
153. 490 U.S. 386 (1989).
154. See Toni M. Massaro, Reviving Hugo Black? The Court's "Jot for Jot" Account of
Substantive Due Process, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1086, 1121 (1998). Massaro states, "Graham is a tiny
tail, but it may wag a very big dog, insofar as it is best read as a renunciation of judicial authority to
define or craft any uncharted rights under substantive due process." Id. (emphasis omitted).
155. Graham, 490 U.S. at 395.
156. See id. at 388.
157. See id. at 388-89.
158. See id. at 389.

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol31/iss1/7

18

Minerva: Preventing "Senseless" Arrests: Searching for a Constitutional Re

20021

PREVENTING "SENSELESS" ARRESTS

control; a physical altercation ensued and the officers accused Graham
of being intoxicated. 5 9 As a result of the incident, Graham suffered a
broken foot, lacerations on his wrist, a bruised forehead, and an injured
shoulder.' 6°
In pursuit of redress, Graham brought an excessive force claim
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.6' On review, the Supreme Court stated that
because section 1983 is not a source of substantive rights in itself, but
merely vindicates rights elsewhere conferred, an analysis under the
section must begin with an identification of the specific constitutional
right infringed. 62 The validity of the claim must then be measured in
reference to the specific constitutional standard which
governs the right,
63
rather than a generalized excessive force standard.1
Thus, the Court held that because of the nature of the situation that
arose in Graham-an excessive force claim in the context of an
investigatory stop-a Fourth Amendment analysis is proper. '64 As a
result, a substantive due process analysis is foreclosed.' 65 The Court
stated that, "[b]ecause the Fourth Amendment provides an explicit
textual source of constitutional protection against this sort of physically
intrusive governmental conduct, that Amendment, not the more
generalized notion of 'substantive due process,' must be the guide for
analyzing these claims.' 66
In his concurrence, Justice Blackmun stated: "I see no reason for
the Court to find it necessary further to reach out to decide that prearrest
excessive force claims are to be analyzed under the Fourth Amendment
rather than under a substantive due process standard.' 67 Justice
Blackmun, who was joined by Justices Brennan and Marshall, found that
because the respondents in this case acknowledged that the case arose
159. See id.
160. See id. at 390.
161. See id. at 394; 42 U.S.C. § 1983 states in pertinent part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of
any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected,
any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the
deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws,
shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper
proceeding for redress.
162. See Graham, 490 U.S. at 393-94.
163. See id. at 394.
164. See id.
165. See id.
166. Id. at 395.
167. Id. at 399-40 (Blackmun, J., concurring). Six Justices made up the majority in Graham:
Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices White, Stevens, O'Connor, Scalia, and Kennedy. Justices
Brennan and Marshall joined Blackmun's concurrence.
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under the Fourth Amendment, there was no need to go further. 68 Justice
Blackmun would have ended the inquiry by stating that since both
parties acknowledge the protections of the Fourth Amendment apply,
that was the appropriate test in this specific case. 161 Patently, he did not
want to foreclose the possibility of a substantive due process inquiry in
other prearrest cases, and Justice Blackmun's concurrence has been aptly
described as posing the question whether a substantive due process claim
should be allowed as an alternative basis for recovery in excessive force
170
cases.
B.

The Expansion of Graham

Initially, the question arose as to whether the Graham rule should
be limited to excessive force claims in the Fourth Amendment context,
or whether the rule should be construed more broadly. The Supreme
Court answered the question in favor of the latter approach over the next
decade. 7' Nevertheless, some uncertainty still exists as to the scope of
the Graham rule, though it has become obvious that the rule will not be
a narrow one. One article, written shortly after the decision, suggested
that the Graham holding was quite narrow, and that "[i]t did not purport
to apply beyond law enforcement excessive force where the [F]ourth
[A]mendment is not properly invoked."'7 2 Now, however, it appears as if
Graham will be applied to all substantive due process claims where a
more specific constitutional right can be identified.'73
1. The Justification for Graham Revisited in the Excessive Force
Context
In Saucier v. Katz,' the Court again had occasion to explain the
rationale for the Graham rule in the excessive force context.' 75 In
Saucier, a protestor was shoved into a van by security forces when he
76
walked toward the Vice President at a public speaking engagement.
168. See id. at 400 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
169. See id. (Blackmun, J., concurring).
170. See id. (Blackmun, J., concurring); J.Michael McGuinness and Lisa A. McGuinness
Parlagreco, The Reemergence of Substantive Due Process as Constitutional Tort: Theory, Proof,
and Damages, 24 NEW ENG. L. REV. 1129, 1157 (1990).

171. See, e.g., Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194 (2001); Albright v.Oliver, 510 U.S. 266 (1994);
United States v. James Daniel Good Real Property, 510 U.S. 43 (1993).
172. McGuinness & McGuinness Parlagreco, supra note 170, at 1156.
173. See Massaro, supra note 154, at1089.
174. 533 U.S. 194 (2001).
175. See id. at 205.
176. See id. at 198.
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The protestor subsequently brought suit alleging the excessive use of
force by law enforcement.77
Justice Kennedy offered a narrow explanation for the Graham
rule. 78 In the context of an excessive force case, Justice Kennedy opined
that a Fourth Amendment standard rather than a substantive due process
test is correct because law enforcement officials are often forced to make
quick decisions.' 79 Such decisions should not be judged in hindsight, but
with the appropriate level of deference considering the circumstances at
hand. "0
Justice Kennedy's reasoning can be reconciled with the majority's
holding in Graham. In Graham, the majority stated "the
'reasonableness' inquiry in an excessive force case is an objective one:
the question is whether the officers' actions are 'objectively reasonable'
in light of the facts and circumstances confronting them, without regard
to their underlying intent or motivation."'' While it may be sensible to
take into account the circumstances of the incident when evaluating the
appropriateness of a police officers actions, there is no reason to reach
the conclusion that a substantive due process inquiry wouldn't serve just
as effectively here.
The Court in County of Sacramento clearly indicated that the first
question in the substantive due process inquiry was whether the actor
had time to deliberate; the standard of culpability is then adjusted
accordingly.'82 While Justice Kennedy appropriately believes that police
officer's need a level of deference when confronted with a situation
where a quick decision is required, his conclusion that a Fourth
Amendment analysis is necessary is unpersuasive. Both a substantive
due process inquiry as well as a Fourth Amendment analysis supply an
appropriate level of deference to an officer's circumstances.
2. The Expansion of Graham Beyond Excessive Force
The Supreme Court has applied the Graham rule in a malicious
prosecution case, and has also considered its application to a case
involving the seizure of property.'83 In Albright v. Oliver, the Court
found that a wrongful prosecution case brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
Property,

Seeid. at 199.
See id. at 205.
See id.
See id.
Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 397 (1989).
See supra Part III.D.
See Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266 (1994); United States v. James Daniel Good Real
510 U.S. 43 (1993).
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needs to be analyzed under the Fourth Amendment rather than
substantive due process. In that case, Albright turned himself over to
authorities after learning a warrant had been issued for his arrest.'85 The
warrant had been issued on the basis of information provided by an
unreliable informant.'86 At a preliminary hearing, the court found
probable cause to bind Albright over for trial.' 7 At a later pretrial
hearing, the court dismissed the underlying accusatory instrument.'88
Albright then brought suit under section 1983 alleging that his
substantive due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment had
been violated because he was prosecuted without probable cause. 89 The
Supreme Court found that the framers envisioned the Fourth
9
Amendment to protect against pretrial deprivations of liberty.
Therefore, his suit would have to proceed under the Fourth Amendment,
not a substantive due process claim, in order to comply with the Graham
guideline.' 9' The Court found that, incorporating some of the language
from the Graham holding and expanding the rule's applicability from
the Fourth Amendment to any amendment "[w]here [the] particular
amendment 'provides an explicit textual source of constitutional
protection' against a particular sort of government behavior, 'that
Amendment, not the more generalized notion of "substantive due
process," must be the guide for analyzing these claims."" 92 The dicta in
Graham, suggesting that the rule would apply to any amendment, thus
became the holding in Albright.'93

184. See Albright, 510 U.S. at274. For a thorough discussion of Albright, see Michael T.
Carton, Note, The Fourth Amendment, Rather Than Substantive Due Process, Must be Used to
Judge a 1983 Claim Alleging a Violation of an Individual's Right to Freedom from Prosecution
Without Probable Cause-Albright v. Oliver, 114 S. Ct. 807 (1994), 25 SETON HALL L. REV. 1560
(1995).
185. See A/bright, 510 U.S. at 268.
186. Regarding the informant,
[O]f the fifty people she identified as dealers, none were successfully prosecuted for any
crime. The Court of Appeals, noting that [the informant] was using her informant's
reward money to buy cocaine for her own use, commented that [the supervising officer]
should have suspected [the informant] was keeping the drugs she bought with his money
and giving him random names from a phone book.
James Lank, The Graham Doctrine as a Weapon Against Substantive Due Process: Albright v.
Oliver, 114 S. Ct. 807 (1994), 17 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 918, 919 (1994).
187. See Albright, 510 U.S. at 269.
188. See id.
189. See id.
190. See id. at 274.
191. See id. at 273-74.
192. Id. at 273 (quoting Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989)).
193. See Graham, 490 U.S. at 394-95.
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As noted above, the Supreme Court has also considered applying
Graham in a case involving the seizure of property.'9 4 In United States v.
James Daniel Good Real Property, the government argued that because
a seizure was involved, only a Fourth Amendment claim, not a
procedural due process claim, could proceed in light of the Graham
rule. 95 However, the Court found that Graham does not support "the
proposition that the Fourth Amendment is the beginning and end of the
constitutional inquiry whenever a seizure occurs.' 96 The Court here
concluded that when the government seizes property, to assert ownership
and control rather than to preserve evidence of wrongdoing, the
government action must comply with the procedural
due process aspects
97
of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.
3. When Does the Court Apply Graham?
When discussing James Daniel Good Real Property, it is important
to note the rationale the Court used in determining that it would not
apply the Graham rule. The Court reasoned that because the "purpose
and effect" of the government action in this case went beyond the
"traditional meaning of search and seizure," the plaintiff was not limited
to a Fourth Amendment claim.' 8 If the government had seized the
property to preserve it as evidence of wrongdoing against an entity, then
the United States may have a valid argument that the plaintiff should be
limited to a Fourth Amendment claim.' 99 However, because the property
was seized with the intent to assert ownership and control (an aspect of
seizure outside of the traditional Fourth Amendment purpose) the
plaintiff was allowed to proceed on both the Fourth Amendment and
procedural due process claims.2°° Although the government's argument
that Graham should control failed in this case, the willingness of the
Court to consider the argument demonstrates the readiness of the Court
to apply Graham to cases involving the seizure of property as well as
persons.
The Supreme Court has consistently turned to an analysis of the
historical basis of the plaintiff's claim in determining whether to apply
Graham. Thus, the Court has resorted to a historical recitation in

194.
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.

See United States v. James Daniel Good Real Property, 510 U.S. 43, 50-52 (1993).
See id. at 50.
Id. at 51.
See id.
at 52.
Id.
See id.
See id.
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Graham, Albright, and James Daniel Good Real Property. In Graham,
the Court found that the history of the Fourth Amendment illustrates that
it covers excessive force claims arising in the context of an investigatory
stop.2 ° ' In Albright, the Court went all the way back to the Framers to
conclude that the claim of malicious prosecution was traditionally one
arising under the Fourth Amendment.022 And in James Daniel Good Real
Property, it was held that the seizure of property by the government to
assert ownership was outside the traditional scope of the Fourth
Amendment.0 3
The Court has used an historical analysis in determining whether to
apply Graham as recently as 1998. In County of Sacramento v. Lewis,
the Supreme Court allowed the plaintiff to proceed with his substantive
due process argument and concluded that he did not have to bring his
claim under the Fourth Amendment despite the Graham rule. °4 The
Court found that a police pursuit with the intention of seizing the
suspects does not amount to an actual seizure within the meaning of the
Fourth Amendment.20° Once again, the Court turned to the traditional
meaning of the Fourth Amendment to determine if the current factual
pattern should be covered by one amendment, or if more than one
constitutional claim should be permitted.2 Therefore, because no
specific constitutional provision was on point to preempt the substantive
due process claim, the argument could proceed. 0 7
C. Would Graham Foreclose a Substantive Due Process Claim in
Atwater?
The expansive reading given to Graham by the Court has caused at
least one commentator to describe the rule as a "threat to the continued
validity of substantive due process analysis., 20 8 Now, if a substantive due
process claim merely "brush[es] up" against another constitutional
provision, the Court would have the discretion to foreclose the claim.2 °

201.
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.

See Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 394 (1989).
See Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 274 (1994).
See United States v. James Daniel Good Real Property, 510 U.S. 43, 52 (1993).
523 U.S. 833, 844 (1998).
See id.
See id. at 843-44.
See id.
Umhofer, supra note 120, at 452.
Id.
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In fact, the lower courts have applied the Graham°rule in the context of
First, Fourth, Fifth and Eighth Amendment cases.2
Professor Massaro has provided the fullest and clearest criticisms of
Graham to date. Among other reservations, he has noted that Graham
limits the number of constitutional claims that a plaintiff may bring.2 ' In
doing so, the Court has violated its "well-established interpretative
principle that multiple constitutional claims may apply to a given
scenario." '
Turning to the case at bar, a classic seizure was involved in the
Atwater case, in that Gail Atwater was pulled over for a traffic violation
and subsequently arrested. 23 The only strong factual difference between
Graham and Atwater is that Atwater did not allege Officer Turek used
excessive force during the arrest. 14 This fact, standing alone, would
probably not be enough to take the case out of the Graham limitation.
The absence of an excessive force allegation does not change or affect
the fact that Atwater was challenging her arrest, a classic seizure within
the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. Such a minor factual difference
does not change the scope of the rule, nor would it have any impact on
an historical analysis of the plaintiff's claim. Therefore, Graham would
appear to prohibit a substantive due process claim on the Atwater facts.
The question then emerges, is anything lost by the imposition of the
Graham rule on the Atwater facts? The answer, I believe, is a resounding
"yes." Professor Massaro correctly anticipated this situation when he
stated: "[C]ases that invoke Graham do so to disallow a substantive due
process inquiry, usually where the preferred specific textual provision
yields little or no protection for the party invoking it."2"- The Fourth
Amendment did not provide the protection that Atwater was seeking in
her case.
210. See Massaro, supra note 154, at 1088; See, e.g., Riley v. Dorton, 115 F.3d 1159, 1166
(4th Cir. 1997) (holding excessive force claim of pretrial detainee needed to be brought under Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment rather than under the Fourth, Fifth, or Eighth
Amendments).
211. SeeMassaro, supranote 154, at 1113.
212. Id.
213. See Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 324 (2001). Gail Atwater's arrest was
the quintessential seizure. "To constitute an arrest ... the quintessential 'seizure of the person'
under our Fourth Amendment jurisprudence-the mere grasping or application of physical force with
lawful authority, whether or not it succeeded in subduing the arrestee, was sufficient." California v.
Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 624 (1991).
214. Originally, one of Atwater's ten claims was excessive force. See Atwater v. City of Lago
Vista, 195 F.3d 242, 244, n.l (5th Cir. 1999), aff'd 532 U.S. 318 (2001). However, this claim was
dismissed in the district court and was never to be heard from again in any Fifth Circuit decision or
the Supreme Court opinion. See id. at 244.
215. Massaro, supra note 154, at 1091 (emphasis added).
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Another commentator has suggested that because the Fourth
Amendment standard is generally less rigorous than the substantive due
process standard, nothing is lost with the imposition of the Graham
rule.216 However, this does not hold true in every instance. In Atwater,
the existence of probable cause to arrest was a motivating factor for the
Supreme Court, and a determinative factor for the court of appeals, in
holding that Gail Atwater was not entitled to relief under the Fourth
Amendment.2 7 The "objective reasonableness" standard the Court
applied under the Fourth Amendment provided leniency for the officer's
arbitrary decision to arrest. 218 In fact, the Supreme Court has held that
"[w]here probable cause has existed, the only cases in which we have
found it necessary to actually perform the 'balancing' analysis involved
searches or seizures conducted in an extraordinary manner. 21 9
Therefore, since Atwater would have no real legitimate claim that her
arrest was "extraordinary," the Court would not even be forced to
conduct the balancing test the Fourth Amendment requires.
Conversely, the substantive due process test would call into
question the "arbitrariness" of Officer Turek's arrest of a first time
seatbelt offender, instead of giving his decision deference. This is true
because the first aspect of the substantive due process inquiry asks
whether the police officer had time to deliberate about his actions; then,
the standard of culpability is adjusted accordingly. 221

216. See McGuinness & McGuinness Parlagreco, supra note 170, at 1157. Again, it must be
remembered that the McGuinness' were writing shortly after the enunciation of the Graham rule
and probably could not imagine the expansive reading the Court would eventually give the rule.
217. See Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 354-55 (2001); Atwater v. City of Lago
Vista, 195 F.3d 242, 246 (5th Cir. 1999), aff'd 532 U.S. 318 (2001).
218. See id.
219. Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 818 (1996).
220. See Atwater, 195 F.3d at 246. Atwater hasn't alleged anything that could sufficiently
prove the arrest was "extraordinary" in this sense of the word.
221. See supra note 144 and accompanying text.
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V.

AN ARREST FOR A MINOR TRAFFIC OFFENSE VIOLATES
SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS

A. Did the Arrest of Gail Atwater Violate the Modern Formulationof
Substantive Due Process?
1. Atwater under the County of Sacramento Test
If the Atwater situation were to be treated as a substantive due
process claim, the test most recently enunciated in County of
Sacramento should guide the analysis .222 County of Sacramento involved
the application
of a substantive due process analysis in the executive
• 223
setting.2 Atwater's claim would be that her substantive due process
rights were violated by an executive official, Officer Turek.
The first factor to look at, as the Supreme Court has made clear, is
the time to deliberate element. 224 Was Officer Turek forced to make a
split second decision akin to situations involving prison riots or high
speed pursuits?
The question should be answered with a definitive "no." Officer
Turek was conducting what should have been a routine traffic stop.
Turek had time to thoughtfully consider the appropriate response in the
situation that confronted him. 5
Keeping in mind that there was no time pressure, the question next
becomes what level of culpability should be used to determine if Officer
Turek's actions "shocks the conscience? 2 Again, the Supreme Court
has made clear that when a police officer has sufficient time to consider
his actions, deliberate indifference toward the plaintiff's well-being may
be sufficient for liability. 7 In Atwater, Officer Turek acted with not only
deliberate indifference, but arguably with an intent to humiliate, which
would satisfy not only the deliberate indifference test, but also the intent
to injure required when the officer has no time to deliberate.
Additional facts shed light on Officer Turek's intent to humiliate
Atwater. As soon as Turek approached Atwater's vehicle, he
immediately yelled something to the effect that, "we've met before," and
222. See supra notes 140-52 and accompanying text.
223. See County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833 (1998).
224. See supra note 144 and accompanying text.
225. While Officer Turek may not have had unlimited time to consider his actions, his situation
was certainly not akin to a prison riot or high speed pursuit. See, e.g., County of Sacramento, 523
U.S. at 852-53.
226. See id. at 848-49.
227. See id. at 850-53.
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"you're going to jail. 228 Such an initial hostility from a police officer
indicates an alternative agenda other than an equitable enforcement of
the traffic law.
2. Probable Cause and the Shocks the Conscience Standard
While it is clear that the existence of probable cause to arrest plays
an important part in determining if an arrest was reasonable under the
Fourth Amendment, 229 it is unclear how much deference, if any, this
factor will receive in a substantive due process inquiry. Surely, it would
be one factor to consider in the overall determination of whether the
executive action "shocks the conscience"230regardless of whether or not it
fits neatly into the above-mentioned test.
If Officer Turek had a legitimate reason to arrest Atwater, such a
determination may render Atwater's claim that Turek's actions "shock
the conscience" less forceful. The City of Lago Vista could argue that
the presence of probable cause illustrates that Turek was not indifferent
toward the well-being of Atwater, but rather the officer was attempting
to enforce the traffic law for the benefit of society. Therefore, an inquiry
is required to determine if Officer Turek had a legitimate reason to
arrest.
Professor Salken opines that the five legitimate purposes of
custodial arrest for a traffic offense are: "1) insuring the presence of the
suspect to answer charges against him or her; 2) obtaining evidence of
the crime of which the suspect is accused; 3) preventing future harm;
4) providing certain social service functions; and 5) maintaining the
proper respect for law and the police. 23
The Supreme Court has acknowledged that Atwater was in no way
a flight risk.232 Her presence at trial would have been almost a certainty.
Furthermore, regarding obtaining evidence, Professor Salken notes that
in cases of most traffic infractions, no further evidence could be gained
through detention.233 Preventing future harm is also a legitimate goal of a
custodial arrest.3 However, this goal seems only applicable to cases
such as an individual driving while intoxicated, where if issued a citation
the offender may continue to drive.235 Furthermore, even a person
228.
229.
230.
231.
232.
233.
234.
235.

Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 324 (2001).
See id. at 354.
See supra notes 144 and accompanying text.
Salken, supra note 12, at 266.
See Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 346 (2001).
See Salken, supra note 12, at 269.
See id.
See id. at 271.
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accused of speeding would prevent a greater threat of harm than a
seatbelt offender. A speeder may represent a threat to others, while one
failing to wear a seatbelt is only a threat to him or herself. 2 6 The social
service functions that Professor Salken alludes to are also not applicable
to arrest for a minor traffic offense. 37 One example of such a function
would be the arrest of a fourteen year old for underage drinking in order
to return that child to his or her parents. 238
The best argument that Officer Turek and the City of Lago Vista
could advance is that the arrest was necessary to promote a proper
respect for law and the police. This argument, however, is defeated by
the facts. Even the Supreme Court has acknowledged that Atwater
would have "buckled up" as a condition of driving off with a citation
rather than ignore the officer. 23 9 Furthermore, the evidence also indicates
that it was Officer Turek who was rude and belligerent throughout the
encounter while Atwater attempted to remain calm. 240 The City of Lago
Vista would be hard pressed to substantiate any assertion that there was
a legitimate reason to arrest Gail Atwater. Absent such a reason, Atwater
should not have been arrested despite the fact that she had violated the
law by not wearing a seatbelt.
VI.

CONCLUSION

It appears that law enforcement officers now have a clear standard
on which they can rely. The Supreme Court has said that a warrantless
arrest for a fine only traffic offense is permissible in light of the Fourth
Amendment.2 4' Furthermore, the current trend in the Court to restrict
substantive due process claims with the Graham limitation could mean
that such warrantless arrests may never be challenged on due process
grounds.
There will be some situations in which an arrest for a minor or fine
only traffic offense is proper. The facts in Atwater, however, did not
support such a conclusion. Gail Atwater should have been issued a
citation and allowed to continue on her way. The Constitution should not
be interpreted to sanction such an arrest merely because a police officer

236. It must be remembered that the issue before the Court was not that Atwater failed to
buckle her children, but rather that she did not use her own seatbelt.
237. See id.
238. See id.
239. See Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 346 (2001).
240. See id. at 324.
241. See id. at 323.
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can point to a minor violation of the law.242 While the conclusion that
any arrest based on probable cause, absent an extraordinary method of
arrest, is consistent with the case law as laid down to this point by the
Supreme Court, such a conclusion is at odds with, if not the letter, the

spirit of the Constitution.
Matthew Minerva*

242. All fifty states authorize warrantless arrests based upon probable cause. See id. at 344.
Some states limit the situations in which an officer may arrest when a traffic violation has occurred
by using mandatory language such as the officer "[s]hall complete the information section and
prepare a notice to appear in court ... and release him from custody," for certain traffic offenses.
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 66-8-123 (Michie 1978).While an analysis of current state laws concerning an
officer's discretion to arrest for minor traffic offenses is outside the scope of this Note, I remain
strongly in favor of revising state statutory schemes to incorporate more situations in 'which an
officer is required to issue citation in lieu of arrest. "Twenty-eight of the fifty states have no
limitations on police discretion to arrest for traffic offense." Salken, supra note 12, at 249-50. Some
statutes which limit the situations in which an officer can arrest even have penalties listed for
officers who disobey. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 32-1-4 (1999). The American Bar Association has
even noted:
It should be the policy of every law enforcement agency to issue citations in lieu of
arrest or continued custody to the maximum extent consistent with the effective
enforcement of the law. A law enforcement officer having grounds for making an arrest
should take the accused into custody or, already having done so, detain him further only
when such action is required by the need to carry out legitimate investigative functions,
to protect the accused or others where his continued liberty would constitute a risk of
immediate harm or when there are reasonable grounds to believe that the accused will
refuse to respond to a citation.
LAFAVE, supra note 72, at 59 (quoting American Bar Association Standards Relating to Pretrial
Release, § 2.1 (Approved Draft, 1968)).
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